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As Judge Posner—an avowed realist—notes, debates between 
realism and legalism in interpreting judicial behavior are as old as 
judging.1 One modern incarnation of the debate involves the validity 
and meaning of empirical legal studies, a breed of scholarship that 
codes information about judicial decisions and uses statistical analysis 
to describe judicial behavior. In our recent article, “Pitfalls of 
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting 
Appellate Decisionmaking,”2 Judge Harry T. Edwards and I argue 
that this scholarship is often marred for a variety of reasons ranging 
from the conceptual to the practical. 
With respect to this issue, Judge Posner provides an important 
counterpoint. Although debates between realists and legalists are 
sometimes heated, Judge Posner recognizes that they are often 
overblown because “[m]uch but by no means all of the apparent 
disagreement [between us] dissolves if proper weight is given to 
concessions on both sides.”3 Although there are vast differences of 
emphasis between the legalist and realist schools of thoughts, the 
models of judicial behavior are essentially similar. 
A “realist legal model,” which combines aspects of both the 
realist and legalist schools of thought, recognizes not only that 
traditional legal materials are a key determinant of judicial decisions, 
but also that law is not deterministic, and that ideology (properly 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Michael A. Livermore. 
 † Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Executive Director, 
Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law. 
 1.  Richard A. Posner, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1178 (2010). 
 2.  Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt 
to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009). 
 3.  Posner, supra note 1, at 1185. 
LIVERMORE IN FINAL 2/11/2010  12:34:00 AM 
1188 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1187 
understood) is also central to legal decisionmaking. This model, 
which better comports with widespread notions of how legal decisions 
are actually made, can serve as a more solid foundation for empirical 
study of judicial behavior than the law-politics divide that 
oversimplifies the complex relationship between legal materials, 
values, and normative analysis that is at the heart of legal reasoning. 
A. The Fundamental Consensus 
In their pure forms, the legalist and realist camps are starkly 
different. The realists see judges as playing a “legislative role,”4 
deciding cases according to preexisting “attitudes” or preferences.5 
The legalist approach in its pure form sees judges as legal “machines” 
simply applying law to facts in a mechanistic process.6 
Of course, no one (or very few, especially within the legal 
community) subscribes to the legalist or realist positions in their pure 
form. Although many have argued against legal formalism, very few 
appear to have strenuously defended this view.7 Alternatively, even 
realists like Judge Posner recognize that law often has an extremely 
important role in determining case outcomes. 
Once these “concessions” are recognized, what remains are 
largely similar views about how judicial decisions are made. This 
shared model (perhaps the realist legal model) proposes that 
traditional legal materials, including precedent, records on appeal, 
and applicable laws and statutes, are central to legal reasoning and, 
combined with widely shared notions of how to interpret those 
materials, dictate outcomes in a large majority of cases. The realist 
legal model also recognizes that law, on its own, is not deterministic, 
and that judges’ values, beliefs, and perspectives—ideology broadly 
construed—influence judicial outcomes. This influence is not bad in 
 
 4.  Id. at 1177. 
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the sense that it is opposed to law or extrinsic to legal reasoning. 
Rather, it has an important and central place in the American legal 
system. Traditional legal materials and ideology, then, are 
complementary aspects of judicial decisionmaking.8 
B. Residual Differences 
Judge Posner identifies two areas of “residual difference.”9 First, 
Judge Posner sees an implicit claim of moral realism in our 
recognition that law includes “forms of moral and political 
reasoning.”10 Judge Posner rejects moral realism, which he defines 
elsewhere as “the doctrine that there are universal moral laws 
ontologically akin to scientific laws.”11 He is therefore troubled by 
what he sees as a moral-realist foundation to our claim that law 
encompasses moral or political reasoning and would instead favor an 
approach that acknowledges only that moral and political beliefs play 
a role in the law. Second, Judge Posner disagrees about the role of 
judicial deliberations in shaping outcomes. 
As to the first objection, moral realism is not a prerequisite to 
our argument. We simply note that judges are sometimes “obliged to 
rely—and to do so self-consciously and overtly—on political and 
ideological values in their legal reasoning.”12 We then argue that 
“[t]his cannot seriously be doubted, nor can it reasonably be seen as 
surprising,” that this practice is included in the meaning of “legal 
reasoning,” and that it is “merely part of the judicial function.”13 
Reasoning, in the sense that we use it, merely implies that the 
“political and ideological values” that judges rely on in their decisions 
are based not merely on “personal whim or preference” but instead 
are based on “a situated and disciplined elaboration of the 
conventional norms of the American political community.”14 This 
“elaboration” can take the form of reflection or discourse with other 
judges, but it does not rely on the existence of objective moral facts, 
 
 8.  Ideology and traditional legal materials, then, are complements—working together to 
produce judicial outcomes—rather than substitutes. This relationship has important implications 
for designing and interpreting the results of empirical analysis. 
 9.  Posner, supra note 1, at 1186. 
 10.  Id. at 1183 (quoting Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1900). 
 11.  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, at ix 
(1999) (adopting “pragmatic moral skepticism” over moral realism). 
 12.  Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1947 (emphasis omitted). 
 13.  Id. at 1947–48. 
 14.  Id. at 1946. 
LIVERMORE IN FINAL 2/11/2010  12:34:00 AM 
1190 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1187 
nor does it preclude the influence of “professional training and 
experiences, political ideology, temperament, [and] personal-identity 
characteristics such as race and sex.”15 In some cases, the law requires 
recourse to moral beliefs, regardless of whether there are objective 
moral truths. Irrespective of the truth of moral realism, decisions 
based on moral beliefs cannot categorically be classified as ideological 
in a manner opposed or extrinsic to law. The realist legal model, then, 
does not rely on any claims about the truth of moral realism. 
The other “residual difference” concerns the role of deliberation 
in judicial decisionmaking. Here there is no doubt a legitimate 
disagreement about an important aspect of judicial behavior. Judge 
Edwards has argued that there is a strong role for deliberation in 
shaping judicial outcomes.16 Judge Posner is skeptical, and has written 
about the potential role of “dissent aversion” rather than deliberation 
in accounting for unanimous decisions.17 Neither of these positions is 
more realist or legalist than the other18—they are simply competing 
empirical hypotheses that both fit within the same basic model. 
Remaining differences tend to be matters of emphasis. Neither 
side denies the importance of unpublished decisions in the work of 
federal courts or the importance of novel legal questions to shaping 
the law, although one camp might focus efforts on one aspect over the 
other. But emphasis on particular legal products does not implicate 
the underlying model of judicial decisionmaking. 
Although the realist legal model finds support among both 
partisans of the legalist and realist camps, it is not typically used as 
the basis for empirical legal studies. As a consequence, those studies 
offer less insight into how judicial decisions are made. By basing their 
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work on a richer model of judicial decisionmaking, empirical legal 
scholars can increase the explanatory power of their work and its 
usefulness in understanding judicial behavior. 
C. Reforming Empirical Legal Scholarship 
Professor Cross succinctly captures the central premise of the 
most influential thread of empirical legal studies: “Judicial politics or 
ideology is commonly juxtaposed with decision making according to 
law. . . . Whether the judge is deciding [cases] according to the better 
legal arguments or to his or her ideology is the question. Quantitative 
empirical research is suited to help answer this question.”19 
The realist legal model renders the question unintelligible. If 
what constitutes “the better legal argument” relies, in part, on 
reference to values; moral and political beliefs; and other components 
of ideology, then there is no conflict between the two—a decision 
need not be made according to law or ideology if one encompasses 
the other. Although some types of ideological considerations should 
not be considered legal arguments, it is not clear that empirical legal 
research, as it has traditionally been practiced, is “suited to help 
answer” whether and when those types of extralegal ideological 
considerations affect outcomes. 
Put another way, ideology, broadly construed, is a necessary 
component of judging. Democratic values; notions of appropriate 
tools of interpretation; concerns about consistency, rule of law, and 
reliance interests; notions of fairness and equity: all of these factors 
can be categorized as ideology. In the vast majority of cases, there is 
sufficient ideological overlap that its distinct role in judicial 
decisionmaking is invisible. Judges and other experienced members 
of the legal community share common ideas about what the law 
means, and those ideas, along with relevant legal materials and 
factual findings, light a clear path toward the resolution of a case. In a 
small number of cases, judges have sufficiently different ideas about 
the appropriate interpretation of legal texts, or moral and political 
values, that they disagree on the appropriate resolution. But these 
types of cases are not necessarily more ideological than any other. 
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Many studies have used judicial appointment variables, such as 
the party of the president who appointed a judge, as a crude proxy for 
judicial ideology. Under the realist legal model, this proxy mixes 
“bad” extralegal ideology with the regular “good” ideology necessary 
for legal reasoning, and is therefore not only crude but also 
confounding. Studies that use this proxy find both too much and too 
little ideology, and the correlations between these variables and 
outcomes say nothing about the role of law or ideology in 
determining case outcomes. Although appointment variables are not 
very instructive about judicial behavior, they may be better suited to 
studies about the appointments process and its effects. 
If empirical legal scholars wish to study whether extralegal 
ideological considerations affect judicial decisions, they must first 
develop an appropriate normative account of what constitute 
extralegal considerations, and then develop a methodology for 
separating out those types of factors from standard, run-of-the-mill 
judicial decisionmaking. Identifying these extralegal factors and 
testing for their influence is a potential project for the field. 
More important for understanding judicial behavior, the realist 
legal model can help refocus empirical legal studies on the legal 
materials at the heart of legal reasoning.20 Some initial attempts have 
been made to study the effect of precedent.21 The task of coding legal 
materials is not easy, but creative solutions or sheer muscle could 
overcome some of the problems, and systematic evaluation of the 
effect of precedent, records on appeal, or legal materials prepared by 
parties, could prove extraordinarily illuminating. More sophisticated 
analysis of the outputs—judicial decisions—could also prove 
extremely useful, and law professors may be well suited to the task.22 
Connecting more fully rendered data on opinions to information on 
precedent, for example, could help generate analysis on the viability 
of certain legal authorities in particular areas of law. 
Given the state of empirical legal studies, this kind of 
sophisticated analysis is a long way off. Large-scale problems of 
coding, computation, analysis, and interpretation must first be 
 
 20.  Other scholars sympathetic to the project of empirical legal scholarship have suggested 
that greater emphasis on the law would help improve research in this area. See, e.g., Barry 
Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 262 (2006). 
 21.  See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1928–29. 
 22.  See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008). 
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overcome. Appropriate questions would require formulation, 
statistical models would require development, and methods for 
generating and processing data would have to be invented. None of 
this will be easy, but abandoning the past emphasis on the illusory 
law-politics divide and founding the field on a more realistic model of 
judicial behavior would be a good start. 
